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Bacon v. Lee
225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000)
L Facts
On February 11, 1987, Robert Bacon ("Bacon") fatally stabbed Glennie
Clark ("Glennie"), the husband of his lover, Bonnie Sue Clark ("Clark").
In 1986, Clark left her marriage because of Glennie's abusive behavior. She
moved in with Bacon and thereafter the two planned Glennie's murder.
Clark was the beneficiary of Glennie's life insurance policy.'
On the night of the murder, Clark and Bacon drove to Glennie's home.
Glennie became angry because Bacon was present and called Bacon a
"nigger." This prompted Bacon to stab Glennie sixteen times. Clark and
Bacon then drove to a movie theater parking lot and set up a robbery to
conceal the murder. Pursuant to this plan, Bacon knocked Clark uncon-
scious and placed Glennie's body in the passenger seat.
2
Later that evening, police found Clark and Glennie in Clark's car.
Clark told the police that they were sitting in the car when she heard the car
doors open and was knocked unconscious. At 1:20 a.m. the following
morning, police went to Bacon's home where they discovered bloody
clothes, shoes, and other evidence. Bacon then confessed to the murder.
Bacon denied that Clark was part of the murder. Later, Bacon admitted that
parts of his story were untrue and that Clark was involved.'
Bacon was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
murder.' The jury recommended a death sentence, which the court im-
posed.' The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction, but
remanded the case for resentencing because evidence of Bacon's role in the
police's apprehension of Clark warranted a jury instruction on the North
Carolina Statutory mitigating factor ("the (0(8) factor") of "aiding in the
apprehension of another capital felon."' The instruction was not given." At
the resentencing hearing, the State did not introduce testimony given by the
1. Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 473-74.
4. Id. at 474.
5. Id. Clark was convicted on the same charges and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Id. at 474 n. 1.
6. Id. at 474; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(f)(8) (1999) (providing that evidence of
aiding in the apprehension of a capital felon is a mitigating factor.
7. Bacon, 255 F.3d at 474.
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investigating officers The (f)(8) mitigating factor was not submitted to the
jury because the State presented no evidence regarding Bacon's statements
to the police or his role in the apprehension of Clark.'
This second jury also recommended a sentence of death and the Su-
preme Court of. North Carolina affirmed." Bacon filed a Motion for
Appropriate Relief ("MAR") on September 25, 1995, in the Superior Court
of Onslow County." He also filed a "Notice of Intention to Amend" in
which he listed claims not addressed in his MAR because they needed
further investigation."2 Bacon's MAR was denied on November 20, 1995."
On February 15, 1996, Bacon filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his
MAR and for permission to amend it.'4 The state MAR court granted these
requests and heard oral arguments on the claims in both his original and
amended motions." The court then denied all claims, stating that it did not
"have the authority to amend, modify, or vacate the [November 20, 1995]
order." 6 The court said that in effect, Bacon was attempting to file a second
MAR because there was no actual pending MAR to amend."
Because the November 20, 1995 order was final, Bacon's claims in the
amended MAR were procedurally defaulted." Bacon was then denied
certiorari in the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the Supreme Court
of the United States." Bacon next filed a petition for federal habeas relief
on twenty-eight claims.' The district court granted summary judgment for
the State on Al issues except Bacon's claim of ineffective assistance of his
counsel based on counsel's failure to present evidence of the (f)(8) mitigating
factor at resentencing 2 The district court determined that Bacon received
ineffective assistance, which made the result of his resentencing "fundamen-
tally unfair, or at the very least, unreliable."22
8. Id. at 474.
9. Id. at 474-75.
10. Id. at 475.
11. Id. The North Carolina Motion for Appropriate Relief is similar to Virginia's state
habeas proceedings.
12. Id.
13. Id. (internal citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. (internal citation omitted).
16. Id. (internal citation omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-1419(a)(1) (1999) (mandating that where defendant
filed a previous motion and was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underly-
ing the present motion but did not do so, he is subject to denial of a MAR).
19. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 475; see State v. Bacon, 483 S.E.2d 179-80 (N.C. 1997) (state court
denial of certiorari); Bacon v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 843 (1997) (denial of certiorari).





Based on the district court's determinations, this cross-appeal was filed
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.3 North
Carolina argued that Bacon's ineffective assistance claim was procedurally
defaulted because he did not raise the claim in his first MAR. Bacon
entered several cross-claims, each of which was denied by the Fourth
Circuit.25
IL Holding
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus,
and affirmed the court's rulings rejecting Bacon's other claims.26 The court
determined that in light of the tactical decisions that Bacon's attorneys had
to make at resentencing, their failure to introduce the (0 (8) mitigating factor
did not constitute ineffective assistanceY Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's determination that Bacon received ineffective assistance
of counsel at resentencing.
28
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Avoidance of Procedural Default
North Carolina argued that Bacon's ineffective assistance claim based
on counsel's failure to present the (0(8) mitigating factor at resentencing was
23. Id. at 473.
24. Id. The state alternately contended that Bacon's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel failed on the merits. Id. at 477.
25. Id. at 479-86. Bacon first contended that the district court erred in rejecting his
daims of ineffective assistance based on the following: (1) counsel's failure to investigate fullymitigating evidence; (2) counsel's decision to present videotaped testimony referring to his
possibility of parole; (3) counsel's decision to tell the jury that Bacon had been sentenced to
death at the first sentencing hearing; and (4) counsel's decision to read portions of Bacon's
testimony from the first sentencing. Id. at 479. The court addressed each claim on the merits
and rejected each in turn. Id. at 480-85.
Bacon next claimed that his sentencing hearing was 'infected* by racial prejudice,
depriving him of due process and a fair trial. Id. at 485. The court summarily affirmed the
district court's denial of this claim. Id.
Bacon finally contended that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
infringed upon because the trial court did not instruct the jury that if Bacon was sentenced
to life imprisonment, he would not be eligible for parole for twenty years. Id. at 485-86. Thecourt determined that because he would be eligible for parole under North Carolina law, he
was not allowed a Simmons instruction on parole eligibility. Id. at 486; see Simmons v. SouthCarolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 (1994) (requiring instruction about parole ineligibity when the
defendant will never be eligible for parole). For further discussion of the court's treatment
of thi claim, see Christina S. Pignatelli, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 403 (2001) (analyzing thecourt's treatment of parole eligibility in Bacon and in Goins v. Angelone, 226 F.3d 312(4th
Cir. 2000)).
26. Bacon, 22 5 F.d at 486.




procedurally defaulted because Bacon did not raise it in his first MAR."
The Fourth Circuit looked to Coleman v. Thompson' and determined that
.a federal habeas court cannot review a claim when a state court has decided
not to review it on the merits based on an "independent and adequate state
'procedural rule."31 According to Ake v. Oklahoma,2 a state procedural rule
is deemed "independent" if it does not "depend... on a federal constitu-
tional ruling."33 A state procedural rule is deemed "adequate" if it is "regu-
larly and consistently" applied by the state court.3
The Fourth Circuit found that the state MAR court relied 6n Section
15A-1419(a) of the North Carolina Criminal Procedure Act, which provides
that when a "defendant is in a position to raise ... the issue" in a previous
MAR, but fails to do so, the court is entitled to deny the defendant's current
MAR. 5 Bacon agreed with North Carolina that Section 15A-1419(a)(1)
.generally" provides a basis for procedural default, but contended that in his
case the application of the statute was not "firmly established."' Bacon
further argued that his amended MAR effectively renewed his original MAR
with amendments as of February 15, 1996, when the court granted his
motion for reconsideration." North Carolina alternately contended that
the state MAR court was "deprived of its authority" to renew the original
MAR b~cause the motion for reconsideration was late."8 Because of this
untimeliness, the State argued that the common law rule that a "judgment
cannot be altered after the end of the term of court in which it is issued"
should be applied in Bacon's case."
Bacon responded to this contention by producing cases in which a
MAR court granted reconsideration after the term of court was ended.,
Because the MAR court had reopened consideration of the original MAR
after its term expired, the Fourth Circuit doubted whether this state proce-
29. Id. at 476.
30. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
31. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 476; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991)
(barring review of a claim that state court declined to review based on an "independent and
adequate" state procedural rule).
32. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
33. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,75 (1985); Bacon, 225 F.3d at 476.
34. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988); Bacon, 225 F.3d at 476.
35. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 476; N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-1419(a)(1) (1999) (providing
appropriate grounds for denial of MAR).
36. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 476.
37. Id. at 476-77.
38. Id. at 477.
39. Id.; see State v. Godwin, 187 S.E. 560, 561 (N.C. 1936) (holding that "until the
expiration of the term the orders and judgments of the court are infieri, and the judge has
power, in his discretion, to make such changes and modifications in them as he may deem
wise and appropriate for the administration of justice").
40. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 477.
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dural rule was actually "firmly established and regularly followed."41 Thus,
whether or not the claim was actually procedurally defaulted was
uncertain.4  For this reason, the Fourth Circuit next reviewed Bacon's
ineffective assistance claim on the merits.4
The Fourth Circuit's decision to review Bacon's claim on the merits
after finding that the procedural default was excused due to the lack of an
"independent and adequate" state procedural rule is notable. Generally, the
Fourth Circuit has no difficulty finding a state rule to create default and bar
review. Counsel should note that there is a potential argument that a rule
is not "independent and adequate" when it is not consistently and regularly
applied."4
B. Judge King's Dissent
Judge King filed a separate dissent based on three of Bacon's claims
which the state court found to be procedurally .defaulted.' s Judge King
argued that the North Carolina state courts had not given these claims
proper consideration.' He further disagreed with the finding that they were
procedurally barred.47 In particular, Judge King believed that Bacon's claim
that his resentencing counsel failed to introduce mitigating evidence of 'his
adaptability to prison deserved further consideration and could potentially
warrant relief.4  I
Judge King examined "adaptability to prison life" as a viable piece of
mitigating evidence.' He pointed to the use of this mitigating circumstance
by other courts and stated that it warranted "respect" as an independent
mitigating factor."0 Bacon possessed considerable evidence about his adapt-
41. Id.; see Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,423-24 (1991) (requiring that the rule applied
must be a firmly established and regularly followed state practice in order to mandate
procedural default).
42. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 477.
43. Id.
44. See Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 246-47 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the rule
articulated in Anderson v. Warden (prohibiting a petitioner from challenging on state habeas
the truth and accuracy of representations made by him as to the adequacy of counsel or the
voluntariness of petitioner's plea unless petitioner offers a valid reason why he should be
permitted to controvert his earlier statements) is not consistently applied);.see Anderson v.
Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981).
45. Bacon, 225 F.3d at 486.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 486-89.
48. Id. at 486, 494. Judge King also looked at the following two claims: (1) that
resentencing counsel disclosed to the jury that Bacon previously had received a death
sentence; and (2) that counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of Bacon's childhood
and background at resentencing. Id. at 486.




ability to prison, and Judge King believed that in conjunction with other
Sixth Amendment claims filed by Bacon, failure to introduce this evidence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and was potentially prejudicial."
Defense counsel should note that Judge King consistently used the
word "adaptability," rather than "adaptation," in his dissent. "Adaptation"
would refer to evidence of the defendant's prior conduct in prison. In
Skipper v. South Carolina,2 the Supreme Court held that evidence of the
defendant's "adaptation" to prison life is proper mitigating evidence. 3
"Adaptability" seems to refer to the defendant's ability in the future to adapt
to prison life. If "adaptability" has that meaning, then it would appear that
future prison life evidence would be admissible either as a mitigating factor,
or evidence which contradicts future dangerousness. However, in CherrixIv. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that testimony
regarding prison life is not proper mitigating evidence."5 Defense counsel
may argue that Judge King's dissent implies that evidence of adaptability to
prison life is appropriate mitigating evidence despite the rule set out in
Cherrix. Even if prison life evidence is not appropriate as mitigating evi-
dence, it should still be admissible to contradict the Commonwealth's future
dangerousness evidence.'
Christina S. Pignatelli
51. Id. at 493-94.
52. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
53. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (relying on Eddings v. Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court found that in capital cases, the sentencer should not be "precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death"); see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
54. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
55. See Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (holding that prison
conditions are not appropriate mitigating circumstances); seealso Walker v. Commonwealth,
515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (Va. 1999) (prohibiting testimony of the Chief of Operations for the
Vrginia Department Corrections to attest to life imprisonment in a maximum security
facility without parole).
56. See Latanya R. White, The Long and Winding Road: The Quest for Admission of
Prison Life Evidence in Virginia Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 359, 37072
(2001) (analyzing the use of prison life evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's case for future
dangerousness).
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